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PARENTAL RATIFICATION: LEGAL MANIFESTATIONS OF
CULTURAL AUTHENTICITY IN CROSS-RACIAL ADOPTION
Kevin Noble Maillard
L Introduction
The question "Who is Indian?" marks a standard subject of academic
inquiry, but to ask "who decides and how" is much more interesting. In Indian
country, state and tribal standards for determining "Indian" may belie personal
and private definitions of identity. While I believe that identity should be self-
defined, the unavoidable truth persists that juridical claims cut across
subjective beliefs to establish a legal standard for determining identity. As is
historically true of legal determinations of race, no single standard of
membership exists that provides a clear boundary of belonging that uniformly
adjudicates who belongs and who does not. Presently, the closest answer lies
within the courts. Judges may exert a great deal of discretion in determining
the racial affiliation of the parties, especially in situations where that
affiliation stands as the determinative factor in litigation. The substantive
reasoning of each case differs in its rationale and logicality, yet this remains
an acceptable obligation of the judge, as a supposedly neutral third-party
observer, to decide.
The specter of authenticity exists as a perennial foe in the daily battles of
life experienced by American racial minorities. In the face of a general
consciousness, which usually means White, minorities run against a dominant
image of what their group is perceived to embody. This creates a
standardizing point against which people of color are measured. These
perceptions may be spoken or silent, believable or absurd, but their existence
in our collective social consciousness testifies to their powerful influence on
perceptions of racial minorities. Whether these are stereotypes, fictions, or
truths, the isolated subject relates to an aggregate theme. The proximity of
part to whole engenders a hierarchy of authenticity that bolsters or palliates
the subject's connection to the group.
The methods of legitimization for legal consideration as a Native American
are neither based solely on considerations of race or culture, but both,
* J.D., University of Pennsylvania; Ph.D. Candidate, University of Michigan; B.A., Duke
University. Member, Seminole Nation of Oklahoma. I would like to thank Professor Barbara
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depending on the jurisdiction. Following the standards established by the
federal government in the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA),' state courts
have held that being Native entails the minimal requirements of proof of
membership in a federally recognized Indian tribe.2 In other states, mere
political membership is not enough.' In order to prove oneself as Indian, a
litigant-parent must present evidence of active engagement in seemingly
Indian activities, which are designated in the mind of the presiding judge.'
The primary problem with the present scheme is that the subjective and
personal tribal considerations of membership fail to achieve the level of
recognition they deserve outside of Indian country.
This Article aims to critique the practice of judicially created definitions of
"Indian" in a hotly contested and controversial area of law: transracial
adoption (TRA).' It is my belief that the evaluation of potential parents as
appropriate, qualified, and situated persons to adopt and care for children of
color stands as a juridical ratification of ethnic authenticity that privileges
those who accede to the judicially created norm while punishing those who
depart form it. At the heart of the controversy of transracial adoption is the
question of what type of ethnic values can the differently situated parent
1. 25 U.S.C. § 1903(3) (2000).
2. Under the Indian Child Welfare Act, the court will assume that tribal enrollment is
sufficient to trigger the Act, regardless of the person's racial, social, cultural, and spiritual
affiliations. See In re Alicia S., 76 Cal. Rptr. 2d 121, 128 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998) (holding that
tribal membership alone is satisfactory to trigger ICWA). But in other cases, the lack of formal
tribal enrollment is not a bar to legal relief. See Michael G. v. Superior Court of San Diego
County, 2002 Ca. App. LEXIS 3473, 7-8 (holding that a parent's failure to report Indian
heritage in a child custody proceeding does not forfeit tribal jurisdiction).
3. These states require proof that, in addition to having Indian blood, the person also
thinks of herself as an Indian. This is evinced in various practices such as her political
affiliations, style of dress, knowledge of tribal language, etc. See generally In re Adoption of
Baby Boy L., 643 P.2d 168 (Kan. 1982) (upholding a requirement of substantial tribal affiliation
to enact ICWA).
4. One judge wrote a detailed description of appropriate Indian activities that would
demonstrate substantial connections to tribal activities. See In re Bridget R., 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d
507, 531 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) (establishing a rubric for participation in tribal activities that
testify to a tribal member's involvement with the tribe). See id. at 528.
5. In conducting research for this paper, I noticed differing applications of terminology
for adoptions involving parents of one race and a child of another. The term "transracial
adoption" is generally applied to cases involving Black children, while "international adoption"
generally applies to cases involving Latino/a and Asian children from countries other than the
United States. Regarding Indian children, "transracial adoption" is generally downplayed,
perhaps because of the greater concern with culture rather than race alone. I will go into further
detail about the these issues below.
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impart upon the child, and whether that parent possesses the cultural
consciousness needed by the child to grow up with a healthy racial identity.
As Professor Barbara Bennett Woodhouse has argued, the law possesses great
influence in ascribing and assigning identity, and the present situation is no
exception.6 The standard concern in legal discourse would surface as: "Can
non-Indians properly raise Indian children?" "Is it possible for Black children
to grow up in transracial families and still have a strong racial identity?"
I would like to shift from these direct concerns with the best interest of the
child7 to what these judicial limitations and restrictions on adoption say about
the parent, and more generally, ethnic identity. In most of this discourse,
which concerns Black children, there is an unstated assumption that racial
values can easily be transmitted by members of those respective racial
groups.8 This is a logical deduction which would include all members of the
respective groups as automatically qualified to raise children of color. Thus,
Black people have the natural ability to raise Black children as much as
Indians have the cultural skills and tribal wherewithal to raise Indian children.
Concomitantly, people from other groups would not have this knowledge.
Therefore their ability to impart an ethnic awareness unto the child is palliated
by the fact that their ethnic origin precludes them from being an optimal
parent.
Inasmuch as this basic analysis focuses on the automatic qualifications of
the inrace prospective parent, it speaks nothing of the cultural specificity of
that subject, thus relying on a precept of essentialism which categorically
overqualifies all those who fit within the category. Whereas movements
against transracial adoption are overinclusive with respects to appropriate
parental demographics, they also disregard any improbability of these parents
6. Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, "Are You My Mother?": Conceptualizing Children's
Identity Rights in Transracial Adoptions, 2 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 107, 111 (1995)
(articulating children's rights to preservation of their identity in adoption).
7. In most states, the "best interest of the child" standard is the majority approach to child
placement. See generally VA. CODE ANN. § 63.2-1205 (2002) (defining best interests of the
child, standards for determining); In re Jacob, 86 N.Y.2d 651, 658 (1995) ("[O]ur primary
loyalty must be to the statute's legislative purpose - the child's best interest."); Macker v.
Macker, 585 A.2d 102, 103 (1991) ("The court must be guided by the best interests of the
child.")
8. One commentator has characterized these traits as "existential starting points."
HAWLEY FoGG-DAVIS, THE ETtucs OF TRANSRACIAL ADOPTION 19 (2002). Fogg-Davis
continues by quoting Naomi Zack, who argues that race categories fail to predict individual
behavior, beliefs, or appearances. "In logical, causal terms, there are no necessary, necessary
and sufficient, or sufficient racial characteristics, or genes for such characteristics, which every
member of a race has." Id. (quoting NAOMI ZACK, RACE AND MIXED RACE 14 (1993)).
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being culturally equipped to transmit the values espoused as essential by
adoption authorities.
The case for Indian children is different, however. In efforts to control the
alarming numbers of Indian children that were taken from their families
placed in adoptive and foster homes, Congress enacted the Indian Child
Welfare Act (ICWA)9 in 1978. The act was intended to give power to the
tribes in dealing with Indian child custody cases, thus transferring the
proceedings to a culturally knowledgeable and sensitive forum.'° ICWA, by
giving tribes exclusive jurisdiction over child custody proceedings," took the
cases out of the hands of outside officials, who may have had inferior
knowledge of the welfare of Indian children. This aimed to correct the
abnormally high numbers of Indian children being displaced from their
families.' 2
The ultimate purpose of ICWA was to retain a greater number of Indian
children within Indian communities, in families that would reflect the values
and traditions of Native culture. 3 Because children embodied the successive
generations of Native populations, the development of such a potential
population was viewed as crucial for the continued existence of Indians in
America."'
9. 25 U.S.C. § 1901 (2000).
10. Id. § 1901(5) ("[T]hat the States, exercising their recognized jurisdiction over Indian
child custody proceedings through administrative and judicial bodies, have often failed to
recognize the essential tribal relations of Indian people and the cultural and social standards
prevailing in Indian communities and families.")
11. Id. § 1911 (a) ("An Indian tribe shall have jurisdiction exclusive as to any State over any
child custody proceeding involving an Indian child who resides or is domiciled within the
reservation of such tribe, except where such jurisdiction is otherwise vested in the State by
existing Federal law.").
12. AMERICAN INDIAN LAW DESKBOOK 377 (Joseph P. Mazurek et al. eds., 2nd ed. 1998).
The actual figures for the number of Indian children being placed out of their homes in the
1970's was alarming. Indian children were much more likely to be placed for adoption than
non-Indian children. See also Indian Child Welfare Program, Hearings before the Subcomm.
on Indian Affairs of the Senate Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 93d Cong. 3 (1974)
[hereinafter 1974 Hearings] available at http://liftingtheveil.org/abourezk.htm (statement of
William Byler) ("The number of South Dakota Indian children living in foster homes is per
capita nearly 1,600 percent greater than the rate of non-Indians. In the State of Washington, the
Indian adoption rate is 19 times, or 1,900 percent greater and the foster care rate is 1,000
percent greater than it is for non-Indian children."),
13. For a terse outline of the statutory considerations of ICWA, see Hon. Maurice Potley,
The Indian Child Welfare Act: A Primer, ARIz. ATr'Y, Feb. 2000, at 24.
14. Barbara Atwood, Identity and Assimilation, 4 MINN. L. REV. 927, 940 (1999)




For both Indian children and Black children, the future of their cultural
identity in the hands of people unlike them has drawn a lot of attention.
Advocates for both groups hold strong views on what constitutes a proper
cultural development in the child, and what type of parent should be
transmitting these values. In this Article, I will uncover the social
construction of the "good parent" of the minority child. In the middle of
criticism of White parents adopting minority children 5 sits a tacit
understanding of cultural authenticity. This known, the line between "good"
and "bad" parents does not logically fall along racial lines, but begins to carve
itself a new line within one of the existing ones. This is my target, and I wish
to assail it.
Children represent the growth and potential of the next generation.
Naturally, their upbringing is a target of concern in the consideration of a
group's station in the future. As for minority groups, the rearing and
education of children has grown into a veritable field of discourse over the
past two decades. 6 The young, it is argued, provide fertile ground for the
transmission of values, and control over how these precepts are transmitted
has become a representative canvas for normative relationships between elders
and youth of a specific ethnic group. Increased rates of transracial adoption
may signal a number of red flags to those concerned: Indians are not good
parents, Indian children fare better outside of Indian communities, White
families correct unhealthy habits 7 of Indian life. It has even been suggested
15. This group consists of African-American scholars and activists whose personal
experiences as Black people inform their opinions on how Black children should be raised. An
in-depth discussion of these viewpoints occurs below. See generally Ruth Arlene Howe,
Transracial Adoption (TRA) : Old Prejudices and Discrimination Float Under a New Halo,
6 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 409 (1997); Ruth Arlene Howe, Redefining the Transracial Adoption
Controversy, 2 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 131 (1995); Jacinda Townsend, Reclaiming Self-
Determination: A Callfor Interracial Adoption, 2 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 173 (1995);
Zanita Fenton, In a World Not Their Own: The Adoption of Black Children, 10 HARV.
BLACKLETTER L.J. 39 (1993).
16. In 1978, Chief Calvin Isaac of the Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians testified at a
congressional hearing on the separation of Indian children from their original home
communities. Chief Isaac argued, "Culturally, the chances of Indian survival are significantly
reduced if our children, the only real means for the transmission of the tribal heritage, are to be
raised in non-Indian homes and denied exposure to the ways of their People." 143 CONG. REC.
E462 (Mar. 13, 1997) (quoted in statement of Rep. Miller).
17. This sentiment has deep roots. Many "liberal" Whites viewed Indian communities as
harmful environments for the development of a "civilized" people. Richard H. Pratt, a
nineteenth-century government reformer, joined many others in efforts to disintegrate Indians
from tribal life. He believed that Indian lands should be broken up, and that the former
inhabitants dispersed amongst Whites so that they would progress beyond aboriginal
No. 1]
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that high outside adoption rates resulted from the premise that "most Indian
children would really be better off growing up non-Indian."' 8 These alarming
concerns led to official programs adopted by children's advocacy groups to
curtail the numbers of minority children being taken out of their home
communities.
I will compare the motivations of two movements in opposition to
transracial adoption of Black and Indian children. I argue that these policies
formalize a racial/cultural rubric to assess who is qualified to import "survival
skills" deemed crucial for the rearing of minority children. Part II raises
questions about the adoption of Black children by non-Black parents. This
establishes the substantial discussion surrounding transracial adoption and
expected parental values. Part I does the same for the adoption of Indian
children by non-Indian parents. The similarities to adoption of Black children
enunciate the in-racial hierarchy of authenticity that unnecessarily reinforces
traditional or even stereotypical behavior. Part IV offers a critique of the
Existing Indian Family (ELF) exception to the Indian Child Welfare Act. I
wish to argue that racial preferencing, as evinced by EF for adoptive
placements rests upon a foundation of essentialism that pigeonholes certain
racial minorities as authentically "Black" or "Indian." Part V argues against
the cultural expectations imposed on adoptive parents of Indian children.
Here, the racial qualifications invoked by EIF stand as prohibitive barriers to
demographically "qualified" adoptive parents who fall outside a majoritarian
conception of "Blackness" or "Indianness."
II. Who May Raise Black Children?
A. The NABSW's Position
In 1972, the National Association of Black Social Workers (NABSW)
issued a powerful statement denouncing the adoption of Black children19 by
barbarisms. In an 1890 speech titled, "The Advantages of Mingling Indians with Whites" he
argued, "If, in the distribution, it is so arranged that two or three White families come between
two Indian families, then there would necessarily grow up a community of fellowship along all
the lines of our American civilization that would help the Indian at once to his feet."
AMERICANIZING THE AMERICAN INDIAN: WRITINGS BY "FRIENDS OF THE INDIAN" 269-70
(Francis Paul Prucha ed., 1973).
18. 1974 Hearings, supra note 12, at 1-2.
19. The NABSW's position includes biracial children as well. See Kim Forde-Mazuri,
Note, Black Identity and Child Placement: The Best Interests of Black and Biracial Children,
92 MICH. L. REv. 925, 927 (1994).
[Vol. 28
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White families.2°
The National Association of Black Social Workers has taken a
vehement stand against the placement of Black children in white
homes for any reason. We affirm the inviolable position of Black
children in Black families where they belong physically,
psychologically and culturally in order that they receive the total
sense of themselves and develop a sound projection of their future.
... Black children in white homes are cut off from the healthy
development of themselves as Black people, which development
is the normal expectation and only true humanistic goal. 2
Reacting to transracial adoption as a form of cultural genocide,22 the NABSW
openly deplored the practice as destructive to the Black community by taking
Black children out of Black environments and placing them in non-Black
homes. The stance marks the first official denouncement of transracial
adoption,23 and it began a discursive framework for an analysis of what types
of adoptive parents are best suited to raise Black and biracial children. The
20. N.Y. Chapter, Nat'l Ass'n of Black Social Workers, Inc., Position Statement on
Transracial Adoptions (Sept. 1972) [hereinafter Position Statement].
21. Forde-Mazuri, supra note 19, at 926 (quoting Position Statement, supra note 20).
22. Position Statement, supra note 20, quoted in Twila Perry, The Transracial Adoption
Controversy: An Analysis of Discourse and Subordination, 21 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE
33, 46 n.47 (1994).
Our position is based on:
1. the necessity of self-determination from birth to death of all Black people.
2. the need of our young ones to begin at birth to identify with all Black people
in a Black community.
3. the philosophy that we need our own to build a strong nation ....
We. . . have committed ourselves to go back to our communities and work to
end this particular form of genocide.
The socialization process for every child begins at birth. Included in the
socialization process is the child's cultural heritage which is an important segment
of the total process. This must begin at the earliest moment; otherwise our
children will not have the background and knowledge which is necessary to
survive in a racist society. This is impossible if the child is placed with white
parents in a white environment.
Id.
23. Prior to the NABSW's statement, the occurrence of White-Black TRA had steadily
increased since the first documented placement in Minnesota in 1948. White-Black TRA
reached its peak with 2,574 placements occurring in 1971. HAWLEY FoGu-DAViS, THE ETHICS
OF TRANSRACIAL ADOPTION 3 (2002).
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NABSW firmly argued that Black children could not learn survival skills for
living in a racist society if they did not grow up in Black homes.24
The NABSW's position works on two levels: the political and the personal.
First, the future of the Black community is dependent on members who
identify with that group. The NABSW concludes that transracially adopted
Black children grow up with affiliations with White culture,25 which separates
them from identifying with the Black community at large.26 Second, it argues
that a healthy racial identity in the Black child can only be developed from
within a Black family. Black children belong with Black parents, who possess
the necessary knowledge to impart to the child about his or her social and
psychological identity as a person of African descent.
27
B. Responses to the NABSW
These critiques of transracial adoption, while admittedly focused on the
best interests of the child, supply ringing statements about the fitness of the
parent to impart a racial consciousness on the children. In consideration of the
identity of Black children raised in White homes, one critic wrote:
Having never been black, the white adoptive parents might not
have been subjected to the kinds of discriminatory treatment that
have been the lot of black people. Therefore, they might not have
needed to maintain in their cognitive and psychic makeup the
expectation of probable oppressive treatment by whites. Nor
would they have needed to develop perspicacity in divining when
a white person was lying to a black one or to become aware of
areas in which oppressive treatment was likely.
... When white adoptive parents are unable to transmit to the
black adoptive child the tendency toward doubt and the temporary
suspension of trust, especially when dealing with white persons,
they are failing to satisfy the "psychosurvival" need of the black
child.28
24. Elizabeth Bartholet, Race Separatism in the Family: More on the TransracialAdoption
Debate, 2 DuKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 99, 102 (1995).
25. See infra note 30.
26. See infra note 30.
27. Forde-Mazuri, supra note 19, at 927.
28. Margaret Howard, Transracial Adoption: Analysis Of The Best Interests Standard, 59
NOTRE DAME L. REv. 503, 540 (quoting Amuzie Chimezie, Transracial Adoption of Black
Children, 20 SOC. WORK 296, 297 (1975)).
[Vol. 28
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The ability of the White parent to instill racial consciousness upon a Black
child is a recurring concern of opponents of transracial adoption, who simply
fear that the child will grow up devoid of Blackness, thus harboring a false
identity of Whiteness.29 The blame of racial displacement is placed upon the
White parents, who despite their good intentions, cannot begin to comprehend
the social chasm that differentiates them from their child.3 °
Despite questions about whether White parents can facilitate the racial
development of Black children, some critics strongly support the advantages
that the children may experience from having parents with greater connections
to the dominant society. White adoptive parents are more likely to be middle
class, while Black parents are more likely to be working or lower class.3
These proximities to sources of privilege and comfort have been argued as
distinct advantages that transracially adopted children have over inrace
placements, because "whites are in the best position to teach black children
how to maneuver in the white worlds of power and privilege."32 Along with
29. In a joint statement, the dean of Howard University School of Social Work and the
president of the NABSW asserted that "Black children who grow up in white homes end up with
white psyches." RITA J. SIMON & HOWARD ALTSTEIN, ADOPTION, RACE, AND IDENTITY 15
(1992) (quoting Sandy Banisky, The Question: Is It Bad for Black Children to be Adopted by
Whites?, BALTIMORE SUN, May 28, 1975, at B1).
30. William Merritt, NABSW president in 1985, testified before the Senate Committee on
Labor and Human Resources to argue for the plight of Black children adopted by White
families. In an infamous statement that characterized transracial adoption as a "blatant form of
race and cultural genocide," Merritt made a number of statements attacking the practice. He
blamed White adoptive families for failing to develop appropriate racial identities in their Black
children: "Black children who have grown up in white families suffer severe identity problems.
On the one hand, the white community has not fully accepted them, and on the other hand they
have no significant contact with Black people." SIMON AND ALTSTEIN, supra note 29, at 36
n.49.
31. Perry, supra note 22, at 96-97 (offering documentation to support propositions about
Blacks' and Whites' perceptions of racial issues concerning transracial adoption).
32. Elizabeth Bartholet, Where Do Black Children Belong: The Politics of Race Matching
in Adoption, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 1163, 1222 (1991).
My thesis is that current racial matching policies represent a coming together
of powerful and related ideologies - old-fashioned white racism, modem-day
black nationalism, and what I will call "biologism" - the idea that what is
"natural" in the context of the biological family is what is normal and desirable in
the context of adoption.
Id. at 1172.
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this proximity comes greater access to education33 and increased racial
understanding.34
In each of these pro-transracial adoption arguments, a racial generalization
occurs that trumps Whites over Blacks in social, economic, and educational
achievements. This process of generalization places adoptive parents in either
of two categories: A) racially ignorant yet socially advantaged, or B) racially
qualified yet alienated from privilege. A general belief exists that membership
in a racial group engenders a kit of parenting traits that precludes the
possibility of integration. These assumptions about race and parenting can be
overinclusive, by saying that all Black adoptive parents are qualified to raise
Black children,35 as well as underinclusive, by overlooking the fact that some
White families may be as aware of racism or even more so than Black
families. Commentators have recognized that some Blacks, particularly
middle-class families, may not be able to fulfill these cultural expectations of
imparting the essential survival skills upon the Black child.36 Emphasizing
this point, Twila Perry asserts that not all Blacks have had the same
experience with racism, and each family will teach their children differently
how to identify with Blackness.37
C. Authenticity
1. Race and Representation
How do Blacks gamer an automatic bid for the potential to parent Black
children, yet Whites do not? Suppose a Black heterosexual couple wants to
adopt a child. They live in an overwhelmingly White neighborhood, are
reasonably educated, and were both transracially adopted themselves. Should
this qualify them as Black parents under the clear rubric of the NABSW?
Most likely, the answer would be no.38 To add to the facts, suppose neither
33. Perry, supra note 22, at 95; Forde-Mazuri, supra note 19, at 964.
34. Forde-Mazuri, supra note 19, at 965.
35. The NABSW's statement categorically qualifies Blacks as adoptive parents for children
of African descent. "Black children should be placed only with Black families whether in foster
care or for adoption." SANDRA PATON, BIRTHMARKs: TRANSRACIAL ADOPTION IN
CONTEMPORARY AMERICA 50 (2000).
36. Forde-Mazuri, supra note 19, at 965 n.225; Perry, supra note 22, at 65.
37. Perry, supra note 22, at 65.
38. One interesting note is that the NABSW's position on transracial adoption tends to
equate those children in mixed families as White people. Despite physical appearance or ethnic
origin, the NABSW basically declares these children as lost to the Black community, beyond
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strongly identify with Black culture. Would their mere racial affiliation as
Black people provide the environment so ardently supported as crucial for the
rearing of Black children? This hypothetical demonstrates the competing
considerations of racial membership and racial identity, which may not
necessarily be the same. Quite possibly, persons considered to be "Black"
may not think of themselves as such.39 This situation complicates and
challenges racial qualifications adopting minority children. It also uncovers
preconceived expectations of racial identity that are categorically qualified by
racial membership.
This hypothetical generates another issue about racial heritage and
representation. Black people have an incredible variety of portraying
themselves. This places the individual differently in relation to incidents of
racism, while affecting her method of coping.4" Wide variations in skin tone,4
hair texture,42 speech patterns,43 and even dress" may affect what one sees and
The lateral transfer of our children to white families is not in our best interest.
Having white families raise our children to be white is at least a hostile gesture
toward us as a people and at best the ultimate gesture of disrespect for our heritage
as African people....
It is their aim to raise Black children with white minds....
.... We are on the right side of the transracial adoption issue. Our children
are our future.
Forde-Mazuri, supra note 19, at 961, n.205 (quoting Morris F.X. Jeff, Jr., President's Message,
NAT'L ASS'N BLACK SOC. WORKERS NEWSL, Spring 1988, at 1-2).
39. The socio-legal predicament of Susie Guillory Phipps is a prime example. Phipps
petitioned the State of Louisiana to have her official racial status changed from "Black" to
"White." See infra note 51.
40. Physical features and cultural cues stand for many as significant determinants of race.
But remarkable variation in these traits make it difficult to classify any one meaning of
blackness. Sandra Patton asks the question, "Are you 'really Black' if your physical features
do not identify you as black - your skin is light and your hair is curly and frizzy, but not
'kinky'?" PATTON, supra note 35, at 60.
41. A number of Black scholars have written personal narratives on the influence of skin-
color in how they are perceived as African-Americans. With the physical appearances of
Whites, these scholars recount tales of Whites questioning their identification as Black, and how
they are treated differently by both whites and Blacks. See generally JUDY SCALES-TRENT,
NOTES OF A WHITE BLACK WOMAN: RACE, COLOR, COMMUNITY (1995); Adrian Piper, Passing
for White, Passing for White, Passing for Black, TRANSITION 58, 4-32 (1992).
42. See generally John Min Kang, Deconstructing the Ideology of White Aesthetics, 2
MICH. J. RACE & L. 283, 312-20 (1997) (chronicling popular and legal accounts of racial
differences in assessing Black hair).
43. See Laura B. Randolph, Why Almost Everybody Loves Colin Powell, EBONY, Nov.
1995, at 100 (discussing America's fascination with Powell and his views on Black English and
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how the world sees him or her. However, the American racial scheme
classifies them as Black, regardless of appearance and presentation, if one
ancestor is Black.45 Depending on one's experience of racism and the way
they are treated by others, a child in that person's care will most likely be
influenced by that parental outlook. If the NABSW's primary concern is the
racial upbringing of Black children, then implicitly, their unwavering stance
toward transracial adoption draws a clear understanding of who is Black
enough to take care of Black children.
2. Cultural Depictions of Race
The imagery of Black cultural authenticity takes a prominent place in
American popular culture. Confronted with the alluring prospects of
economic security and social acceptance, Black Americans balance the
influences of majority (i.e., White) culture with those of Black culture. 46 This
is to be expected from a minority culture, but most times the dialogue that
surrounds cultural diversity opts out of a language of "cultural exchange" to
one of preservation. Thus, at base lay an identifiable subject worthy of
scrutiny as essential to the social survival of the minority group. The loss of
this distinctive trait demonstrates the culturally enervating force of
assimilation, which champions a normativity of Whiteness.47 In these
standard English).
44. See generally Nancy Murray, Striking a Balance: Students, Educators, and the Courts:
School Safety: Are We on the Right Track?, Symposium: Creating a Violence Free School for
the Twenty-First Century, 34 NEw ENG. L. REV. 635 (2000) (exploring the implications of hip-
hop clothing on freedom of expression in American high schools).
45. JAMES F. DAVIS, WHO IS BLACK: ONE NATION'S DEFINmON 5 (1997) ("In the South it
became known as the 'one drop rule,' meaning that a single drop of 'Black blood' makes a
person a Black. It is also known as the 'one Black ancestor rule,' some courts have called it the
traceable amount rule,' and anthropologists call it the 'hypodescent rule,' meaning that racially
mixed person are assigned the status of the subordinate group.")
46. W.E.B. Dubois' famous statement illustrates this balancing process: "One ever feels
his twoness, - an American, a Negro; two souls, two thoughts, two unrecognized strivings; two
warring ideals in one dark body, whose dogged strength alone keeps it from being town
asunder." W.E.B. Dubois, Our Spiritual Strivings, in THE SOULS OF BLACK FOLK (1903).
47. Sharon Rush, the adoptive mother of a Black-White biracial child, recalls a
confrontation with her daughter's elementary school teacher:
One of my daughter's primary teachers assured me in our initial meeting that she
did not even see my daughter as Black. This is a classic expression of the color-
blind philosophy and it came in response to my attempt to talk about my
daughter's Blackness with the teacher and try to assess how she viewed the
importance of race. The teacher immediately tries to reassure me that she is not




situations, the suspicious absence of a distinct minority culture is popularly
translated as becoming White.
Popular culture provides powerful definitions of Black behavior in relation
to Whites. Blacks that fail to assert cultural differences between themselves
and Whites are seen as ignorant of their own community and culture.4" In
politics, the nomination of Clarence Thomas to the Supreme Court raised
questions in the mind of many Blacks whether he would adequately offer a
Black point of view.49 When the Cosby Show first ran, Whites questioned its
authenticity as a representation of a professional Black family." In Louisiana,
a court declared a woman to be legally Black, even though she viewed herself
as a White woman. 5' And of course, the archetypal Uncle Tom of Harriet
Beecher Stowe's novel52 serves as the model for the Black figure who
teacher meant well by her comment and probably meant that my daughter's
Blackness did not cause her to be prejudiced against my daughter. I also knew,
however, that the teacher's unwillingness to positively acknowledge my
daughter's race was, itself, a form of racism even though she was not fully aware
how negative her comments were.
SHARON RUSH, LOvING ACROSS THE COLOR LINE 36-37 (2000).
48. For example, Afrocentric scholar Molefi Kete Asante once asserted, "I am clear that the
aping of whites is the road to neither intellectual respect nor ethical decency. Africans who
exhibit confusion about their personal identities cannot hope to be clear about cultural identity."
Greg Thomas, The Black Studies War: Multiculturalism vs. Afrocentricity, VILLAGE VOICE, Jan.
17, 1995, at 23; see also NATHAN HARE, THE BLACK ANGLO-SAXONS (1965) (criticizing
African-Americans who assimilate into mainstream society).
49. Civil rights leaders categorically opposed Thomas' position on the Supreme Court.
Rev. Al Sharpton questioned Thomas's paradoxical stance on affirmative action, "Clarence
Thomas lives in the suburbs, a life that was given to him as a result of the civil rights
movement." Eric Lipton, Ministers to Picket Justice's House, WASH. POST, Sept. 2, 1995, at
B2. Questions were also raised about Justice Thomas' potential as a role model for Black
children. A Louisiana attorney opposed the nomination because "His values are not consistent
with the values I want my daughter to have." Saundra Torry, Among ABA Lawyers, The Talk
is of Thomas, WASH. POST, Aug. 13, 1991, at A4.
50. See generally Jeannye Thornton, TV's Disappearing Color Line, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REP., July 13, 1987 (describing the effects of Black television shows on Whites' impressions
of Blacks).
51. In 1983, Suzy Guillory Phipps had applied for a passport in Louisiana and on the
application, represented her race as White. When the passport agency checked her application
against her birth certificate, which read "Black," her application was rejected. She fought to
have her racial designation changed, Doe v. Louisiana, 479 So. 2d 369 (La. Ct. App. 1985),
which resulted in a string of litigation that was ultimately denied cert by the Louisiana Supreme
Court. An excellent description of this case appears in VIRGINIA DOMINGUEZ, WHITE BY
DEFINITION: SOCIAL CLASSIFICATION IN CREOLE LOUISIANA 1 (1994).
52. HARRIET BEECHER STOWE, UNCLE TOM'S CABIN (Jean Fagan Yellin ed., Oxford Univ.
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foolishly oversteps racial boundaries in his efforts to please Whites.53 Which
one of these Blacks as prospective parents, would fulfill the NABSW's
conception of the appropriate parent who could convey the "survival skills"
and prevent the cultural genocide of Afro-America? Each figure can be
considered Black, and each has undoubtedly experienced forms of racism in
their lives as people of color. Even Michael Jackson may be victim, but surely
his physical transformation from Black to brown to gray54 may be a point of
contention for his racial competency.
3. Authenticity and Transracial Adoption
It would be shortsighted to ignore the subtle, yet clear implication of
cultural authenticity in the selection of parents in transracial adoption. If
Blacks are deemed the best potential parents for Black children, this naturally
assumes that White people are unequivocally less suited to become parents of
Black children. The racial difference here is the obvious reason for this
selection hierarchy, and it is based on the potential understanding of the Black
child's racial experience. If Blacks understand it better than Whites, then,
with the wide variation of experiences among Blacks, there too must be
differentiation.
Presumably, the logic of the NABSW is to instill community and continuity
among Black America by including all children of African descent within the
fold of its category of urgency. The eligible parents for these children would
be anyone who could meet the minimum requirements of race. This asks
nothing of what they understand of race, whether it has any importance to
them, and whether they want it to be a part of their child's life. By casting
such a wide, categorical net, there is sure to be internal prioritization among
eligible Black parents who would be more or less able to raise the Black child
as a "Black child." A strong argument could be made here in defense of
parental privacy, in that racial restrictions on adoption are premised upon the
fact that the Black child be raised in a certain way. There is no guarantee that
the Black adoptive parent will fulfill the cultural expectations of Black
Press 1998) (1852).
53. The online glossary, "The Rap Dictionary" has defined "Uncle Tom" as "(n) A black
man who wants to be white. From the book Uncle Tom's Cabin. (n) A tattle-taler, a person
who befriends another only to deceive him, usually in the workplace." The Rap Dictionary
(2003), at http://www.rapdict.org/terms/u (last visited Sept. 21, 2003).
54. See Joel Garreau, What Turns Ebony To Ivory: An Unofficial Diagnosis of Pop Star's
Skin Disorder, WASH. POST, Feb. 12, 1993, at Cl (discussing Michael Jackson's change of




activists who so ardently demand that race be the primary parental benchmark
in selection criteria. While Whites are presumed unqualified for their racial
ignorance, Blacks are categorically welcomed without consideration of their
racial knowledge. The possibility that they may fail in this respect allows for
(and I would argue even encourages) discretion amongst the decision makers
along the lines of racial authenticity. The consideration of how the child will
be brought up racially is quickly answered by categorical considerations of
race. But this is an unreliable predictor of the strength of the child's racial
upbringing among persons who are supposedly "just like her."
III. Who May Raise Indian Children?
A. A Brief History of the Indian Child Welfare Act
Since 1978, ICWA has given tribes jurisdiction over adoption proceedings
involving Indian children and non-Indian parents." The Act gives tribes
greater power in response to a lack of cultural sensitivity of state courts in
these matters. At the time of the Act, statistics revealed a disproportionate
number of Indian children being involuntarily removed56 from Indian homes.57
These reasons were traced to the actions of non-Indian social workers and
courts who estimated good parenting skills according to White middle-class
values.58 The Director of the Association of American Affairs testified in
55. Jo Carrillo, Introduction to READINGS IN AMERICAN INDIAN LAW 15 (1998).
56. This is to be distinguished from cases where Indian parents had arranged privately to
have their child adopted by a non-Indian party.
57. In 1978, the statistics for the displacement of Indian children were alarming.
[A] minimum of 25 percent of all Indian children are either in foster homes,
adoptive homes, and/or boarding schools, against the best interest of families,
tribes, and Indian communities. Whereas most non-Indian communities can
expect to have children out of their natural homes in foster or adoptive homes at
a rate of 1 per every 51 children, Indian communities know that their children will
be removed at rates varying from 5 to 25 times higher than that.
1974 Hearings, supra note 12, at 1. Some reports quoted as high as thirty-five percent of Indian
children under the age of one had been adopted. Cynthia G. Hawkins-Leon, The Indian Child
Welfare Act and the African American Tribe: Facing the Adoption Crisis, 36 BRANDEIS J.FAM.
L. 201, 202 n.5 (1997-1998).
58. Sandra Patton, a White adoptee of White parents, addresses the racialized, middle class
ideal of American adoptions in her book BirthMarks: Transracial Adoption in Contemporary
America. In her childhood, her parents presented her with the childrens' book The Chosen
Baby, to help her understand the adoption process. The last page of the book left an indelible
impression on her memory, picturing Mr. and Mrs. Brown and their children, a tightly-knit,
adoptive family at home. She recalls the picture as "the ideal nuclear family: the two children
lie on the floor in front of the fireplace with their dog and cat, while their parents read and sew
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front of Congress about the damaging impact of White values used in
assessing Indian families:
I think one of the primary reasons for this extraordinary high rate
of placing Indian children with non-Indian families rather than in
Indian homes is that the standards are based upon middle-class
values; the amount of floor space available in some, plumbing, and
income levels. Most of the Indian families cannot meet these
standards and the only people that meet them are non-Indians. 9
Taking away this incursive authority over Indian children aimed to restore
decision-making power to tribal institutions that had a better understanding of
the needs of Indian children. This works two ways. First, tribal institutions
are better situated for a contextual assessment of Indian family structures.
60
Second, tribes had an increased stake in the future of their young people.6'
Running tandem with the more legal orientation of ICWA was the political
issue of transracial adoption. Because the numbers of Indian children adopted
claimed such a significant proportion of the youth population, a threat to
cultural augmentation existed that was more drastic than among Black
children.62 The social component of ICWA focused on the transmission of
in their 'family room."' In her adult life, she characterizes the ideological assumptions that
underlie adoptive families.
First of all, Mr. and Mrs. Brown are a nondisabled, White, middle class,
heterosexual married couple, and it is no accident that their caseworker's name is
Mrs. White. In fact, everyone in the story is White and middle class. The
presence of the social worker is significant in adoption stories - she approves the
adoptive parents and "finds" the baby. She represents the state's definition of
good parents.
PATTON, supra note 35, at 29 (citing VALENTINA WASSON, THE CHOSEN BABY (1950 rep.)
(1939)).
59. Statement of William Byler, 1974 Hearings, supra note 12, at 5.
60. Advocates of ICWA wanted Indian family structures to be valued in the placement
process. Extended kinship structures beyond the traditional nuclear family were offered as
cultural differences in childrearing that needed to be accounted for. James Shore & William
Nicholls, Indian Youth and Tribal Group Homes, A Whipper Man, in 1974 Hearings, supra
note 12, at 106-07.
61. Indian leaders viewed the retention of Indian children as a form of preventive mental
health care for Indian communities. By maintaining a sense of cultural identity at an early age,
problems of family breakdown and general social damage could be controlled. Id. at 107 ("The
children leave home; the family breaks down; and it is impossible to reverse the process or
repair the damage.")




cultural values from Indian adults to Indian children.63 Transracially adopted
Indian children, living in communities isolated from Indian people and culture,
were viewed as culturally whitewashed.
During the adolescence of these people, they were raised with a
white cultural and social identity. They are raised in a white home.
They attended, predominantly white school, and in almost all
cases, attended a church that was predominantly white, and really
came to understand very little about Indian culture, Indian
behavior, and had virtually no viable Indian identity....
[.. T]hey were finding that society was putting on them an
identity which they didn't possess and taking from them an identity
that they did possess.'
Because these children grew up as "White" instead of "Indian," they were to
face significant social anxieties later in life. The doctor listed the
psychological symptoms of "chronic insecurity, free floating anxieties, panic
reactions, [and] difficulty adapting to family life and adulthood" as common
among these culturally displaced children.65
But the doctor's most telling statement does not involve psychological
health, but cultural essentialism. "[B]ecause of their racial characteristics, the
majority of society refuses to let them express that majority cultural identity
and they're forced into an identity which they really don't know how to
behave in. They really don't know how to act as Indians should."66 ICWA
responded directly to the inability of White parents to provide the special
cultural upbringing that Indian children deserved - to teach children to
behave as Indians "should." Here, the focus switches away from the child to
the prospective parent. As the potential arbiter of culture and education for
the Indian child, this parent has become the canvas on which to portray
various interpretations on the type of Indian the child is to become.
ICWA also sets preference placements for the custody of Indian children.67
Section 1915 requires that the child be placed first with a member of his/her
extended family,68 then other tribal members, then other Indian families. At
63. Miller, supra note 16.
64. Statement of Dr. Joseph Westermeyer, Department of Psychiatry, University of
Minnesota, 1974 Hearings, supra note 12, at 46.
65. Id. at 45.
66. Id. at 49.
67. See generally Mazurek, supra note 12.
68. Title 25 U.S.C. § 1903(2) defines "extended family member" as
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the very bottom of this hierarchy is the option of placement in a non-Indian
home. These preferences work as a kinship hierarchy which places most value
upon blood and culture. However, allowances are made for "good cause"
when the child should be placed with a non-Indian home.6 9
This paper does not address the jurisdictional issues of ICWA or the social
concerns of the best interests of the child. I seek instead to analyze the
underlying meaning of the Act, and the implications it shares with standard
objections to the transracial adoption of Black children. If courts apply the
law to these custody proceedings, normative decisions are made as to the
fitness of the parent to raise the child. Inherent in this decision, particularly
concerning minority children, is an estimation of the cultural perspicuity of
the prospective parent. Usually, this analysis is simplified by contextual clues
such as race. It is assumed that in-race placements raise no questions of
cultural transmission, and interracial placements categorically do. This wide
reliance oversimplifies in-racial alliances in a way that presumes a uniformity
of cultural experience amongst all Indians (or all Blacks). The next section
discusses the dangers posed by conferring discretion on courts to define
Indianness.
IV. Existing Indian Family Exception
To begin, ICWA does not come into effect if there are no Indian parties
involved, and some jurisdictions interpret this as a requirement for an existing
Indian family. Statutory language applies ICWA in any "child custody
proceeding" in a state court "involving an Indian child."7 If the child is
domiciled on the reservation, then the tribe has exclusive jurisdiction over the
matter.7' If the child is domiciled off the reservation, then the matter may be
transferred to the tribe, absent any objection by either party.72 The language
defined by the law or custom of the Indian child's tribe or, in the absence of such
law or custom, shall be a person who has reached the age of 18 and who is the
Indian child's grandparent, aunt or uncle, brother or sister, brother-in-law or
sister-in-law, niece or nephew, first or second cousin, or stepparent[.]
Mazurek, supra note 12, at 397 n.90.
69. Id. § 1915(a), (b) (2003); see also In re Interest of Bird Head, 213 Neb. 741, 749-50
(1983) (holding that factual support as to "good cause" for failure to comply with statutory
placement preferences are necessary for appellate court review)
70. 25 U.S.C. § 1911(a) (2003).
71. Id.
72. Id. § 1911 (b). For an example of the determination of domicile of an Indian child born





of the application and jurisdiction of ICWA depend on the definition of
Indian, which, within the statutory language of ICWA, is not defined.
Presumably, the definition of Indian comes from the tribe, which defines
membership for themselves as an exercise of tribal sovereignty." But a
number of courts follow the Existing Indian Family exception (EIF) to
determine whether "legitimate" Indian people and culture would be affected
by ICWA. This issue is debatable, yet it is clear that ICWA does not provide
for state courts to question the tribe's definition of "Indian," which is
statutorily assumed.
One commentator has argued that the EIF assesses the "Indian-ness of the
family74", by allowing the court to decide whether the adoption of an Indian
child would prevent him or her from being "part of an existing Indian family
unit or any other Indian community."75 First, this requires that the child form
a bond with a parent that is Indian. Second, there must be a significant tie to
tribal culture or a reservation.76 Courts adopting the exception require a
demonstration of a connection to an Indian way of life in order to decide
whether ICWA should apply at all. This provides a way for courts to avoid
the application of ICWA to child custody proceedings.77 Additionally, this
enables courts to act as tribunals of cultural authenticity that stand to approve
or deny a party's claim under ICWA in opposition to the petitioner's
declaration of tribal affiliation.
A number of courts have rejected the existing family exception, however.
These opinions fall into two primary camps. First, there is the statutory
concern that applying the exception adds nonexistent language to the Act.
78
73. Tribes have ultimate discretion over who may qualify as a member. These membership
requirements can even contradict the constitutional rights of an American citizen, yet tribal
sovereignty gives the Indian nations complete independence in their requirements. For a
controversial example of tribal dominion over the determination of membership, see Santa
Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 72 (1978) (holding that tribal exclusion of children of
Indian women who married outside of the tribe is a prerogative of the tribe under principles of
tribal sovereignty and thus not violative of equal protection).
74. Wendy Parnell, The Existing Indian Family Exception: Denying Tribal Rights
Protected by the Indian Child Welfare Act, 34 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 381, 398 (1997).
75. In re Crews, 118 Wash. 2d 561, 569 (1992).
76. Parnell, supra note 74, at 398.
77. Toni Hahn Davis, The Existing Indian Family Exception To The Indian Child Welfare
Act, 69 N.D. L. REv. 465, 475 (1973).
78. See In re Alicia S., 76 Cal. Rptr. 2d 121, 128 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998) ("There is no
threshold requirement in the Act that the child must have been born into or be living with an
existing Indian family, or must have some particular type of relationship with the tribe or his or
her Indian heritage.").
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Second, non-Indian courts are culturally ill-equipped to adjudicate matters
concerning Indian families, and the application of EIF destroys the original
protective purpose of ICWA.79 Both of these ideas compete with the shared
logic of supporters of the exception for the "true" legislative purpose of the
Act. Whereas jurisdictions that support the doctrine believe they apply ICWA
when the parties are actually "Indian," its opponents support a broad-based
application based upon a strict reading of the law. The following cases
demonstrate the jurisprudential approaches to the ELF.
A. In re Baby Boy L
One of the first exercises of the judicially created exception is In re
Adoption of Baby Boy L,8° which involved the child of an unwed Kiowa father
and a non-Indian mother. The mother had arranged for the adoption of the
child by a non-Indian couple, who in turn petitioned the state court to declare
the absent father unfit in effort to terminate his parental rights."' Under a
temporary order of custody, the child was given to the care of the non-Indian
couple. The father, who was incarcerated at the time of the proceedings, was
given notice of the pending adoption, and with the intervention of the Kiowa
tribe, sought to block the adoption under an ICWA claim.82 The trial court
denied the applicability of ICWA, and the tribe appealed.
The Kansas Supreme court agreed with the holding of the lower court,
concluding that it was against the intention of the Act to include situations that
did not involve the removal of a child from an Indian home." Because the
child was born out of wedlock to a non-Indian mother and was never under the
care of the father, the court reasoned that ICWA would not apply." The court
also invoked the issue of blood quantum, raising suspicion as to the strength
of the tribe's claim:
79. Quinn v. Waiters, 845 P.2d 206, 209 n.2 (1993). ("Engrafting a new requirement into
ICWA that allows the dominant society to judge whether the parent's cultural background meets
its view of what 'Indian culture' should be puts the state courts right back into the position from
which Congress has removed them.").
80. 643 P.2d 168 (Kan. 1982).
81. Hahn Davis, supra note 77, at 479.
82. Baby Boy L., 643 P.2d at 202.
83. Hahn Davis, supra hote 77, at 479.
84. Id. (". . . Congress never intended the Act to dictate that an illegitimate infant who has
never been a member of an Indian home or culture, and probably never would be, should be
removed from its primary cultural heritage and placed in an Indian environment over the express




In this case Baby Boy L. is only 5/16ths Kiowa Indian, has never
been removed from an Indian family and so long as the mother is
alive to object, would probably never become a part of the
[father's] or any other Indian family. While it is true that this Act
could have been more clearly and precisely drawn, we are of the
opinion that to apply the Act to a factual situation such as the one
before us would be to violate the policy and intent of Congress
rather than uphold them.85
In this situation, the court ignores the father's reliance on Indian heritage to
result in a judicially created standard for tribal membership, which is
insufficient to invoke the Act. Because the child had never lived with the
father and was "only 5/16ths Kiowa," the court could not foresee the
integration of Indian culture in the life of the child. In the opinion of the
court, the child of Indian descent was not an "Indian child." Moreover, the
court rejected the father's eleventh-hour assertion of race and culture for the
retention of the child. In contrast to the legal language of ICWA which would
semantically justify the father's claim, the court fails to recognize his identity
as a decisive factor.
B. In re Adoption of Crews
In re Adoption of Crews examines the cultural affiliations of the Indian
parent as they would apply to the Act. In this case, an Indian mother sought
to revoke her consent to the adoption of her child by a non-Indian family.86
The Supreme Court of Washington denied her appeal to regain custody of her
child on grounds that she neither had been affiliated with her tribe nor lived
on the reservation. The court, relying on Baby Boy L., was "convinced that
ICWA was not intended to apply in the situation presented by the specific
facts of this case."87 The opinion stated:
In this case, however, Crews and the Choctaw Nation ask this court
to apply ICWA when B. has never been a part of an existing
Indian family unit or any other Indian community. Neither Crews
nor her family has ever lived on the Choctaw reservation in
Oklahoma and there are no plans to relocate the family from
Seattle to Oklahoma. Bertiaux, B.'s father, has no ties to any
85. Baby Boy L, 643 P.2d at 175.
86. 825 P.2d 305 (Wash. 1992).
87. Id. at 567.
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Indian tribe or community and opposes B.'s removal from his
adoptive parents. Moreover, there is no allegation by Crews or the
Choctaw Nation that, if custody were returned to Crews, B. would
grow up in an Indian environment. To the contrary, Crews has
shown no substantive interest in her Indian heritage in the past and
has given no indication this will change in the future."8
The court found that Crews' late appropriation of her Indian heritage was a
weak plot in efforts to keep her child. Her lack of ties to the reservation in
Oklahoma supposedly demonstrated her lack of understanding of Indian life,
which would preclude her ability to raise her child as an "Indian child."
In this light, the court elevates the concept of Indianness above a racial
consideration in favor of a geographic and cultural one. Regardless of Crews'
genealogical ties to a Native American background, the court did not see her
as a culturally identified Indian woman. Race does not make one Indian here;
rather, the concerted involvement in tribal culture does. Her subjective claim
to her heritage did not find a sympathetic ear on a bench seeking a more
aboriginal conception of Indian. It did not help that she had only recently
discovered her heritage as Native American, in addition to the knowledge of
what specific tribe she was descended from. The court saw her as an urban
White woman with remote connections to an Indian heritage.
C. In re Bridget
The court in In re Bridget also showed such contempt for a plaintiff who
revealed his Indian heritage after concealing it secret in order to facilitate the
adoption of his twin daughters.8 9 The father, a Pomo Indian, enrolled as a
tribal member after the custody proceedings had begun, at the behest of his
mother. On behalf of the father and his extended family, the tribe intervened
in the custody proceedings, relying on ICWA to bring the child under tribal
jurisdiction. 90 Finding this formal standard of tribal affiliation insufficient for
ICWA purposes, the California court invoked the existing family doctrine to
regulate the application of the Act to apply only to children of Indian descent
who would have substantial ties to an Indian community. Although the twins'
father had a legitimate claim to tribal membership, the court did not believe
him to maintain a "significant social, cultural or political relationship with an
88. Id. at 569 (emphasis added).





Indian community."91 For this reason, the court found constitutional
problems92 with applying ICWA, stating, "At the same time, however, we
agree with those courts which have held that this purpose will not be served
by applying the provisions of ICWA which are at issue in this case to children
whose biological parents do not have a significant social, cultural or political
relationship with an Indian community.
93
Bridget demonstrates the power of the court to set standards of cultural
authenticity that directly oppose the subjective claim of the appealing party.
This effort to invoke a standard of Indianness allows the law, as a
disinterested third party, to step outside the local facts and construct a
universal scheme of cultural traits that signify one's designation as Indian.
While the role of courts is to assess facts and resolve disputes, this power to
assess and rule on cultural identity is potentially problematic. Because the
existing family exception is not stated anywhere within the statutory language
of ICWA,94 each court is left with the discretion to decide its applicability.
Such haphazard discretion generates a suspicious jurisdictional question that
leaves the parties at the mercy of the personal racial prescriptions of
individual courts. This seems dangerous, for in the efforts to construct
objectivity, there still exists the lingering subjective opinion of the judge.
Thus, the pivotal point of racial ascription centers around an epistemological
battle of culture and race. Depending on where one litigates the ICWA claim,
there could or could not be a cultural rubric that would pose an initial barrier
to one's claim as Indian.
V. Effects of Cultural Representations of Indians
Before a serious discussion of the adjudication of Indian authenticity may
begin, it is of critical importance to recognize that there exists no written
definition of a cultural or racial threshold for the application of ICWA or any
91. Id. at 520.
92. The court found that the application of ICWA upon strict racial grounds would raise
Equal Protection questions. In the case that ICWA were applied to all descendants of tribal
members, this would classify all such children as racial Indians. This would qualify ICWA as
an application based solely, or predominantly upon race, which makes it subject to strict
scrutiny. Id. at 528. To avoid this question of the constitutional dangers of ICWA, the
California court relies upon a definition of tribal membership that is based upon social, tribal,
and cultural affiliations. Crystal v. Superior Court, 69 Cal. Rptr. 2d 414, 422 (1997), held that
cultural ties were crucial to avoid constitutional problems in ICWA.
93. Id. at 526.
94. Parnell, supra note 74, at 406.
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other federal scheme for Native Americans.95 Because the Existing Family
Exception of ICWA does not originate in written statutory language,96 it
stands as judicially created policy without the political authenticity of a
legislatively created, legally standardized rubric that identifies the real Indians
from the fake ones. Even if there were such a test, the various prongs would
be rooted in a normative conception of what a Native American should be.
The idea of the Indian did not come from within, but was an externally
imposed vision of what White spectators interpreted as Indian culture.9 7 As
the dominant political group, Whites flattened the diverse, polyglot, and
variegated nature of Indian culture into a racial classification, which lumped
all indigenous peoples into a monolithic group.98 The great variety of physical
types, languages, and cultures were lost to the generalizing process of race.99
Some critics argue that Indians did not become "Indians" until "White" people
came to "America."'" From the beginning of the colonial era, Whites have
had definite opinions of Native Americans - an assuredness of thought that
persists to the modem era. While most Americans have some knowledge of
95. The statutory language of ICWA relies on tribal definitions of "Indian." 25 U.S.C. §
1911 (a) (2000). Thus, according to local standards of membership drawn by the praying tribe,
ICWA should adopt that same standard. Felix Cohen recognizes the complexity of the terms
"Indian," "tribe," and "band." FELIX COHEN'S HANDBOOK OFFEDERALINDIAN LAW 2-5 (Univ.
of N.M. photo. reprint 1971) (1942). However, Cohen relies on statutory language for a more
precise definition of Indian: "[A]ny person of Indian descent who is a member of any
recognized tribe now under Federal jurisdiction." Id. at 12 (citing 25 C.F.R. 161.2).
96. Some cases have taken strong stands against this absence of statutory language, and
follow a strict interpretation of ICWA. Quinn v. Walters, 845 P.2d 206, 209 (Or. App. 1993)
("It is not for state courts to add additional requirements."); In re Alicia S., supra note 2, at 128
("When statutory language is clear and unambiguous there is no need for construction and
courts should not indulge in it.").
97. ROBERT BERKHOFER, THE WHITE MAN'S INDIAN 4 (1978).
98. Id.
99. Michael OmJ and Harold Winant have conducted a detailed study of the historical
emergence of racial classification in America. MICHAEL OMI & HAROLD WINANT, RACIAL
FORMATION IN THE UNITED STATES (1994); see also RACIAL CLASSIFICATION AND HISTORY
(Nathaniel Gates ed., 1997).
100. BERKHOFER, supra note 97, at 3-4. It was because of this perceived physical difference
that Whites invented the idea of race to distance themselves from the indigenous inhabitants.
In fact, the idea of Whiteness and the privilege that it affords depends on the continued
existence of groups considered non-White. Without the otherness of the minority groups, the
discriminating concepts of "civilization" and "superiority" could not be sustained. See Cheryl
Harris, Whiteness As Property, 106 HARv. L. REV. 1707 (1993); see also WINTHROP JORDAN,
WHITE OVER BLACK 27 (1969) ("Inevitably, the savagery of the Indians assumed a special




Indians, these suppositions are more likely to be based on hearsay, imagery,
and stereotypes rather than actual encounters with Native American people.'l
In this section, I address the stereotypes of Native Americans that affect the
application of the Existing Indian Family doctrine. There are three primary
areas in which courts have reflected that litigants fall short of being
considered as Indian. In each of these areas, courts hold preconceived,
majoritarian views of Indian authenticity that are derived largely from cultural
lore and popular production. This materializes in three primary forms. First,
courts have expressed doubts as to the legitimacy of the petitioner's blood
quantum, which asserts racial makeup as an important measure of authenticity.
Second, courts hold distinct views on cultural practices that they view as
distinct to native communities, which are largely based upon appeals to
religious essentialism. Third, courts adhere to strong views on geographic
locations that are appropriate for Native American families, thus reserving the
application of ICWA for those living in predominantly Indian communities.
Litigants that challenge these judge-made views have less chance of being
considered under ICWA.
A. Blood Quantums
The aesthetic composition of the Indian has been depicted with such
richness of tongue that few Americans would be free from its descriptive
power. Narratives of colonial encounters with Indian savages frequently focus
on the physical aspects of the indigenous people. Amerigo Vespucci's
descriptions of the indigenous in Brazil provided much fodder for the
sixteenth-century European imagination:
We found in those parts such a multitude of people as nobody
could enumerate.., a race I say gentle and amenable. All of both
sexes go about naked, covering no part of their bodies; and just as
they spring from their mother's wombs so they go until death.
They have indeed large square-built bodies, well formed and
proportioned, and in color verging upon reddish. This I think has
come to them, because going about naked, they are colored by the
sun. They have, too, hair plentiful and Black... They are comely,
101. According to the latest census, the states where Whites are most likely to encounter
Native Americans are Alaska, Oklahoma, and New Mexico. More populous states, such as New
York, Illinois, and Massachusetts, each have Indian populations of less than one percent.
Census 2000 PHC-T-6 tbl. 3 (Apr. 2, 2001), at http://www.census.gov/populationlcen2000/
phc-t6/tab03.pdf (last visited Sept. 21, 2003).
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too, of countenance which they never themselves destroy; for they
bore their cheeks, lips, noses and ears." 2
With these narratives focused on the physical difference between the observer
and the Indian, the descriptions rested upon the distinctive characteristics that
separated red from non-red: long, Black hair, "tawny skin," and prominent
features. Much attention was placed upon the reddish hue of the skin.
The reliance on visuality can be an unreliable symbol of cultural
affiliations. If one's physical appearance satisfies a burden of proof for Indian
authenticity, then anyone who falls outside of this expectation of appearance
has a higher threshold to achieve.'0 3 Because the cultural impression of the
Native American is so strongly ingrained, deviations from the mythology fail
to fulfill an idealized (and perhaps unrealistic) vision of Indianness. This is
especially difficult for Indians who have mixed racial ancestry.1°4 Mixed
blood Indians have more difficult issues with identity and recognition0 5 when
others refuse to see them as who they are."° Additional racial strains may
102. BERKHOFER, supra note 97, at 7-8.
103. Patricia Penn Hilden, a mixblood Indian of Nez Perce and European descent, recalls
going to see Dances With Wolves with upper-class Brits in Cambridge, England. After
requesting her to attend the film in "traditional Native clothing" to the showing, the wife of a
colleague displayed ultimate fascination in Hilden's identity as Indian in regards to her White
appearance. "Fiona" barraged her with relentless questions:
"One thing, Pat, you don't look at all like the Indians. IfI hadn't known already,
I'd never have known .... I am sure... none of my friends would ever know.
Do they know in Trinity Hall? Did they know you when you were in King's?
Does anyone ever talk about it? I shouldn't think they would because you don't
look it at all. You could be all white."
PATRICIA PENN HILDEN, WHEN NICKELS WERE INDIANS 183-84 (1995).
104. William S. Penn estimates mixbloods to comprise over half of the entire Indian
population in the United States. WILLIAM S. PENN, AS WE ARE Now: MIXBLOOD ESSAYS ON
RACE AND IDENTrrY 2 (1997).
105. A number of scholarly articles have been written that focus on the difficulties of gaining
federal recognition for Indian groups that have mixed racial strains. See generally Cindy D.
Padgett, The Lost Indians of the Lost Colony: A Critical Legal Study of the Lumbee Indians of
North Carolina, 21 Am. INDIAN. L. REv. 391, 391 (1997) (describing the problems of the
Lumbees of North Carolina gaining recognition because they are generally White in
appearance); Gerald Torres & Kathryn Milun, "Translating Yonnondio" by Precedent and
Evidence: The Mashpee Indian Case, in CRITICAL RACE THEORY 177-90 (Kimberle Crenshaw
et al. eds., 1995) (depicting the Mashpee of Massachusetts, who failed to meet judicial
conceptions of "tribe" because of their mixed racial status and affiliation with Blacks); Martha
Minow, Identities, 3 YALE J. L & HuM. 97 (1991) (arguing for the Mashpee as a viable Indian
tribe).
106. In 1993, the Ramapough Mountain people applied for federal recognition. With plans
[Vol. 28
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol28/iss1/3
No. 1] PARENTAL RATIFICATION
outweigh one's rightful claim to Indian identity. °7 Thus, the addition of
outside ancestries disrupts a judicial image of a fullblood Indian as the
prototypical Native American, to which all others are measured.
Despite an individual's claim of identity, it is widely believed that
increased dilutions of blood demonstrate directly proportional ties to an Indian
community. This hypothesis focuses on the ethnicity of the non-Indian party
in a marriage, which suggests the cultural affiliations and leanings of the
Indian party involved.'0 8 Thus, a person with a high quantity of non-Indian
blood categorically has fewer ties than a person who is predominantly Indian.
Courts interpret this dilution of blood as a dilution of culture.0 9
B. Cultural Practices
On a strong par with physical images, the nonnative imagination of how the
Indian should act and live claims substantial influences on the ICWA
exception. Family ties or an Indian environment fall a close second to blood
as the test of whether the court actually finds these families to be Indian. It
may be possible that ICWA orders the return of a child to a community
consisting of people of native descent, but in some jurisdictions, those
surroundings may not be Indian enough. 0 Blood and genealogy aside, the
to open up a casino that would compete with other gaming establishments in the New York City
area, Donald Trump questioned their status as an actual tribe: "They sure don't look like
Indians to me." Trump opposed the recognition of the Ramapough because their casino would
potentially detract from the success of his own. Tribal Rights: Refining the Law of
Recognition, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17, 1993, at 4-6.
107. Particularly if the additional racial ingredient is Black, the task of racial classification
becomes a balancing issue of cultural affiliation. The Black Seminoles of Oklahoma have faced
difficulty in gaining recognition from their own tribe. See Aaron R. Brown, Judgments:
Brothers Fighting Over Indian Money: The Right of Seminole Freedmen to a Portion of the
Indian Claims Commission Judgment Fund, 11 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 111 (1983); see also Who
Is a Seminole, and Who Gets to Decide, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2001.
108. This theory is the basis of the tribe's argument in Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, supra
note 73, where women who married outside the tribe were seen as more likely to move outside
the bounds of the reservation and lose touch with their culture of origin. Men, however, who
intermarried were seen as categorically able to maintain cultural ties while being married to an
outsider. The controversial policy of the Santa Clara Pueblos limited membership to the
children of male members who intermarried, while denying membership to the children of
intermarried women. The Supreme Court upheld the membership restriction.
109. See supra note 108.
110. Some courts scoffed at the idea of formerly White litigants who had invoked their
Native ancestry in order to bring an ICWA claim. The courts did not view them as Indians who
would be able to provide an authentically native environment for the child. See In re Bridget,
supra note 4, at 425 ("Such token attestations of cultural identity fall short of establishing the
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ability to be included as Indian under the auspices of ICWA was greatly an
issue of behavior.11' Here, the court decides whether the child would become
exposed to native cultures and traditions, and in doing that, the court holds the
power to determine what these cultures and traditions are." 2 Even if this court
incorporates Indian perspectives into its rulings, it still palliates the individual
right of self-definition, potentially deferring to expected images of Indian
culture.
It is not only a genealogical standard that courts view as necessary for an
ICWA claim, but also a cultural one" 3 that represents something significantly
different from a mainstream environment." 4 In considering what an Indian
existence of those significant cultural traditions and affiliations which ICWA exists to preserve
...."); In re Crews, supra note 86, at 310 ("Crews has shown no substantive interest in her
Indian heritage in the past and has given no indication this will change in the future."); Crystal
v. Superior Court, 69 Cal. Rptr. 2d 414, 425 (1997) ("His interest in his Indian heritage is a
recent phenomenon, sparked, as it would appear, by the commencement of the dependency and
the notice provided by the Agency.").
111. At times the logic of physical appearance is completely over-ridden by behavior.
"In [Steve McLemore's] youth, there was a kid in school [whom he] used to
call... Spec and he was red-headed and freckle-faced. But he was on the rolls as
Cherokee Indian ... He was, to all intents and purposes, white. But spiritually he
wasn't. His mother wasn't white, obviously, because he was one of the most
stubborn Cherokees and he wouldn't speak anything but Cherokee... This boy
was accepted by the whole run of the school as Cherokee... The mother had
raised a red-headed, freckle-faced kid... an INDIAN kid. So it's the culture
rather than the blood quantum.
Hilden, supra note 103, at 146. However, at base in Spec's behavior is the qualification of
blood quantum. Despite the inability of his Indian ancestry to materialize physically, his strong
identification as Indian reasserts his cultural alliances.
But lack of blood connections may not categorically disqualify one as a member of a
cultural group. In MARK TWAIN, PUDD'NHEAD WILSON (Norton ed., 1980), two babies are
switched at birth. One child is one-thirty-second Black, and the other is purely White. The
"Black" child grows up "White," while the "White" child grows up Black. At adulthood, the
switch is revealed, yet both characters have been acculturated (perhaps racialized), so thus
reversion is impossible. To add to the irony of the novel, townspeople quickly refer to blood
as the cause of each boy's bad behavior, wrongly depending on race and ancestry to provide
origins for reproachable conduct.
112:. See Woodhouse, supra note 6.
113. In PostIndian Conversations, Gerald Vizenor upsets what he sees as a reliance on blood
as a measurement of authority on Indian culture. Eschewing a genealogical requirement for the
Indian author, Vizenor questions the validity of blood as a talisman of authenticity. He
eloquently writes, "Native blood is not the same as experience or imagination, and the metaphor
of native blood is certainly not measured by the liter or even the reservation colonial pint."
GERALD VIZENOR, POSTINDIAN CONVERSATIONS 150 (1999).




environment is, courts rely on images perpetuated in culture but not law. This
provides a nebulous set of subjective characteristics that has no uniformity
across jurisdictions. Because cultural practices involve so many variables, the
standard is less easily interpreted than genealogy or geography. There exist
no quantitative or physical indicia of Indianness. In California, the court in
In Re Bridget enunciated its standard as:
In considering whether the biological parents maintained
significant ties to the Tribe, the court should also consider whether
the parents privately identified themselves as Indians and privately
observed tribal customs and, among other things, whether, despite
their distance from the reservation, they participated in tribal
community affairs, voted in tribal elections, or otherwise took an
interest in tribal politics, contributed to tribal or Indian charities,
subscribed to tribal newsletters or other periodicals of special
interest to Indians, participated in Indian religious, social, cultural
or political events which are held in their own locality, or
maintained social contacts with other members of the Tribe."'
While this opinion relies primarily on political activity as the benchmark for
its cultural connections, other courts have even more ambiguous standards,
which are openly stereotypical views of the ways that real Indians live. In
Alicia S., the courts recognized certain practices as typically Indian, despite
the fact that they rejected the ElF exception. Describing the litigant's
connection to an Indian community, the court noted that, "he has attended
yearly Indian pow-wows, enrolled in Indian programs to deal with his alcohol
problem, and attended several "sweats."' 6 This picture fulfills a typical image
of the Indian in the White mind: a befeathered figure who dances, drinks, and
sweats. While it may be naive to say that courts unfairly and completely base
their decisions on such imagery, it is certainly arguable that they lend relation
to questionable cases. In other words, reference to familiar and expected traits
may bolster a juridical standard of measuring Indian culture.
To ascertain authenticity of Native American culture entails the close
relationship to a majoritarian interpretation. Authenticity will be granted if
homes which will reflect the unique values of Indian culture." 25 U.S.C. § 1902, quoted in In
re Alexandria, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d 679, 684 (1996). It is understood that "Indian culture" means
reservation culture. A good test for the limits of this clause would be the placement of a child
with an urban Indian family - one that unquestionably identified as Indian.
115. In re Bridget R., 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 507, 531 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996).
116. In re Alicia S., 76 Cal. Rptr. 2d 121, 129 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998)
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the subject accedes to the common conception of Indianness. The popular
images, grounded in archaism, have achieved a commercialized status that
enables outsiders to become vicarious Indians during the moment of
consumption. William Penn, a mixblood author, has termed this a "creation
of fakery"' 17: "Kachinas made in Taiwan, Sweat Lodge ceremonies at local
health clubs, dreamcatcher key chains, authentic reproductions of Anasazi
dwellings at "The Garden of the Gods" in Colorado Springs, or crystal skulls
through which Laguna woman teach people to channel.""'  The
commodification of Indian culture has presented a tableau of Indian
representations to the majority culture," 9 who in turn essentialize these
practices and items as necessary and sufficient traits of Native American life.
The reliance on the conflation of blood and culture, however, may not bring
the results desired by the jurisdictions that practice the EIF exception. These
classic exertions of the EIF assign greater capital to culture than blood. The
courts that follow the existing family doctrine bypass the danger of an equal
protection challenge by eschewing race for culture as the trigger for
consideration under the Act. This places more emphasis upon cultural
behavior or a deliberate demonstration of Indianness rather than invoking
racial specificity. If the courts were to apply the Act categorically to all
registered Indians who invoked it, "Indian" would figure a racial
classification, which would enact strict scrutiny review. 20 Nevertheless, these
represent overinclusive standards that may qualify some litigants as approved
Indian families (which may also include unwilling litigants who choose not to
identify culturally as Indian). Authenticity is the goal of these courts, which
employ judicial discretion in the appropriate application of ICWA. Seeing
that courts have been scornful of parties with tenuous connections to Indian
tribes, 2' it is evident that the EIF exception is employed to exclude those who
117. PENN, supra note 104, at 2.
118. Id.
119. Movies about Native Americans with Whites as the main characters are such an
example. In his book Mixedblood Messages, Louis Owens calls Dances With Wolves "the
perfect, exquisite reenactment of the whole colonial enterprise in America... a revisionist,
politically correct western[.]" Louis OWENS, MIXEDBLOOD MESSAGES 114 (1998).
120. Bridget R., 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 531 ("However, any application of ICWA which is
triggered by an Indian child's genetic heritage, without substantial social, cultural or political
affiliations between the child's family and a tribal community, is an application based solely,
or at least predominantly, upon race and is subject to strict scrutiny under the equal protection
clause.").
121. Id. at 530 ("Such token attestations of cultural identity fall short of establishing the
existence of those significant cultural traditions and affiliations which ICWA exists to preserve,




would otherwise be considered as assimilated Whites. This demonstrates a
crucial oversight by courts that rely on culture more than blood in their efforts
to ferret out "fake" Indians. If courts are aiming for "authentic" Native
Americans that have both blood and cultural ties, what does this make of
urban Indians? Furthermore, how do these standards account for Indians
raised outside of tribal societies, and have recently become involved in Indian
politics and culture?
But what about the forty-five-year-old man who suddenly
discovers he has one-quarter Mowhawk blood, for whom the
discovery means not only graduate school financial support, but
also a new world of "Indian culture"? Who becomes an assiduous
attender of sweat lodges and powwows, wearer of Indian jewelry
(made by Dine, Zuni, Hopi jewelry makers, not by Mohawks),
speaker of strangely accented, but heavily "spiritual" language...
This man's blood is quite genuine; he even looks part-Indian. But
is he?'22
This articulates the problems that courts have in their attempts to crystallize
the lifestyles of Native Americans into a terse legal opinion that will satisfy
an ICWA application. The reliance on culture is based upon a variety of
unstable factors whose availability is contingent upon the cultural
expectations of the court.
C. Geographic Standards
The Noble Savage' 23 dwells in the jurisprudential state of nature,
unadulterated by contemporary culture and its assimilating influences. Nature
sustains an image unfettered by human art and civilization.
Lo, the poor Indian? whose untutor'd mind
Sees God in clouds, or hears him in the wind
His soul proud Science never taught to stray
For as the solar walk or milky way;
Yet simple nature to his hope has giv'n
Behind the cloud-topped hill, an humbler heav'n'24
the Act.").
122. Wilden, supra note -103, at 200.
123. Rousseau's conception of the Noble Savage is the pivotal figure for the realization of
civil society. Without the savage to measure against the civilized, civil society ceases to exist.
See generally JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, SECOND DISCOURSE ON INEQUALITY (1755).
124. ALEXANDER POPE, ESSAY ON MAN, quoted in BERKHOFER, supra note 97, at 79.
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This picture of Indians, as being close to nature, 125 propels a visionary
standard of the indigenous citizen in the wilderness. Indian storytelling
punctuates this image, with tribal creation myths finding root in nature, having
animals as primary storytellers."2 6 And the locations of most reservations, in
rural areas most heavily concentrated in western states, 127 contribute to the
idea of the Indian in nature. For Indians to exist apart from the natural
environment undermines the popular conception of the aborigine as the human
embodiment of the natural state.
The romance of the aboriginal environment stands as a measure of cultural
authenticity for Indians attempting to assert their identities as modern citizens.
"[M]ost Whites still conceive of the 'real' Indian as the aborigine he once
was, rather than as he is now. White Europeans and Americans expect even
at present to see an Indian out of the forest of Wild West show rather than on
a farm or in a city.' ' 28 These cultural conceptions of Indian habitats and
surroundings place a heavy burden of persuasion on Natives who live outside
of these environments. With over half of all Indians living in cities or
towns, 129 certainly the image of the natural Indian does not exactly comport
with reality.
Natives who live outside of Indian Country face a higher burden of proof
in declaring their own identity. In some ways, the decision to remain
physically detached from an Indian community signals an acceptance of
mainstream culture while simultaneously rejecting the link between homeland
and identity. 13' Big city environments generate new social issues for urban
125. Vizenor, supra note 113, at 117.
126. One well known creation story involves the conception of earth as the Great Turtle.
Unlike fairytales, which boast of cloud-filled kingdoms, castles, and treasures, Indian stories are
more likely to have speaking animals in forests, or humans interacting with nature. See
generally JAMES HOWARD & WILLIE LENA, OKLAHOMA SEMINOLES: MEDICINES, MAGIC, AND
RELIGION (1984); PAUL RADIN, THE TRICKSTER: A STUDY IN AMERICAN INDIAN MYTHOLOGY
(1956); JAMES MOONEY, MYTHS OF THE CHEROKEE (1996).
127. There are 275 Indian reservations in the U.S., amounting to 56.2 million acres of land
held in trust for the tribes by the federal government. Internal Revenue Serv., U.S. Dep't of the
Treasury, Indian Tribal Govt's: FAQ's Regarding Miscellaneous Issues, at http://www.irs.gov/
govt/tribes/article/0,,id=108394,00.html (last visited Sept. 21, 2003).
128. PENN, supra note 104, at 1 (quoting Berkhofer).
129. Id. at 85.
130. Some scholars argue that one of the main concerns of Indian tribes is the preservation
of property rights. Land, as a commodity held in common amongst a tribal nation, is many times
the most valuable asset that a tribe may hold. From financial purposes of land and mineral
profits, to political purposes of sovereignty, the concept of property began and continues as a




Indians (who most often are mixed bloods131 ) who live in communities
unfamiliar with Indian culture and Indians in general. This equal segment of
the Native American population is ignored as a subject of inquiry, perhaps for
the failure of mainstream society to acknowledge their identity as an authentic
Indian culture.'32 Instead, studies of Indian populations are much more likely
to focus on reservation populations to the exclusion of other areas and forms
of Indian life.'33
VI. Conclusion
American courts are not unfamiliar to juridical definitions of race. Legal
history proves court intervention in administering membership within a
cultural group in order to determine one's standing to the law. 3a This
emerged in contexts of antimiscegenation prohibitions, slave codes,
immigration restrictions, internment camps and segregation laws. Presently,
courts are dealing with the latest public discomfort with challenges to the
irreproachable authentication of monoracial families. Such public debates
over what type of parent may raise what type of child demonstrate our
country's deep-seated uncomfortability with ambiguous racial boundaries.'35
They also comment on a national dependence upon race as a method of
defining social order.
So these are old debates in new forms. We depend upon race as a general
social order to construct and impose clarity upon the smallest unit of society:
the family. Most discussion of transracial adoption focuses upon the best
Against American Indians in Johnson and Graham's Lessee v. M'Intosh and The Pioneers, in
CULTURES OF UNITED STATES IMPERIALISM 109 (Amy Kaplan & Donald E. Pease eds., 1993).
131. PENN, supra note 104, at 85.
132. Despite the paucity of popular interest in the urban mixed blood, there have been
mainstream examinations, many being the products of Native fiction writers who have
characters that struggle with issues of race, culture, and authenticity. These writers include
Leslie Marmon Silko, Darcy M'Nickle, Betty Louise Bell, Michael Dorris, and Louise Erdich.
133. Vine Deloria, Jr. bitterly criticizes academia for setting the epistemological agenda for
Indian Country. Focusing on anthropologists (a designation wide in scope), he blames academia
for the intellectual colonialism that it brings to Indian communities, most times drawing
conclusions and conferring data from past articles rather than accepting the community on its
own terms. See generally VINE DELORIA, JR., CUSTER DIED FOR YOUR SINS (1972).
134. See generally Christopher Ford, Administering Identity: The Determination of "Race"
in Race-Conscious Law, 82 CALIF. L. REV. 1231 (1994).
135. 1 am indebted to Barbara Woodhouse, Who Owns the Child: Meyer and Pierce and the
Child As Property, 33 WM. &MARY L. REV. 995, 1121 (1992), for providing a theoretical unity
for this article.
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interests of the child. However, the underexamined side of that coin is the
identity of the parent to provide a loving home for the child. It is ironic that
in these fierce and polemical debates on developing racial identities in
children that their caregivers must struggle at the mercy of the court to have
their own race examined, judged, and assessed in efforts to determine what is
best for the child. Undeniably, the genesis of the child's cultural health and
esteem lies within the parent. Yet, the psychological autonomy of the
caregiver to define him/herself in the face of societal expectation upsets an
unadulterated, private relationship between parent and child.
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